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employee tendered dues and initiation fee
to the union which had a union shop contract ,vith her employer. The union
then wrote her a letter welcoming her into membership. She replied that
although she had tendered dues and initiation fee she was not joining the
union. The union thereupon requested her employer to discharge her pursuant
to the provisions of their union shop agreement signed under the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act.1 After going through the regular grievance
procedure the matter came before the arbitrator for .final settlement. Held,. the
union was entitled to demand the employee's discharge. The proviso to section
two, eleventh of the Railway Labor Act as amended in 19512 [which was intended to be similar to provisos (A) and (B) to section 8 (a) (3) of Title I
of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 19473] protects an employee from
discharge under a union shop agreement only when the union denies membership. The proviso does not apply when the employee specifically refuses to
join the union even though she tenders the requisite dues and initiation fee.
Pan American WorldAinuays, Inc., 20 Lab. Arb. Rep. 312 (1953).
Although recognizing his right to decide the controversy de novo, the
arbitrator in the present case distinguished a decision4 by the National Labor
Relations Board protecting employees from discharge where they tender dues
and initiation fees and indicate their ,villingness to join the union, but refuse
to take an oath of fidelity to the union, attend a union meeting, or fill out an
application card. While the two cases can be distinguished, the respective
decisions seem to follow more from divergent interpretations of the legislative
history of the LMRA than from any factual distinctions. While the arbitrator
specifically refused to decide whether the union can require an employee to
sign an application card or can impose any other requirements, and held only
that the employee must refrain from an overt act making it impossible for

AcCEP'l' UNION I\1Bl\mERSHIP-An

64 Stat. L. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §152.
"Providea, that no such [union shop] agreement shall require such condition of
employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available upon the same
terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to
employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not
including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership." 64 Stat. L. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §152.
3 "Provideil f11rt1ier, That no employer shall justify any discriminaton against an
employee for non-membership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and
conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) i£ he has reasonable grounds for
believing that memberhip was denied or tenninated for reasons other than the failure of
the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership••••" 61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
(Supp. V, 1952) §l58(a)(3). Senator Hill, in reporting out the Railway Act amendment
for a unanimous committee, said: "In the limitations imposed [on allowing a union shop]
and the nature of the right granted, the bill closely follows the pattern of parallel provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act." 96 CoNG. REc. 15736 (1950).
4Union Starch and Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), affd. (7th Cir. 1951) 186
F. (2d) 1008, cert. den. 342 U.S. 815, 72 S.Ct. 29 (1951).
l
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the union to consider her a member,0 the NLRB does not seem to make this
distinction. In fact, the Board stated the issue in Union Starch and Refining
Co. as "whether an employee who tenders . . . initiation fees and • • . dues
[is] within the protection from discharge. •.. "6 The NLRB concluded that
the only power the union has to demand discharge is to protect itself from
"free riders."1 The dissenting members of the Board, moreover, interpreted
the majority's decision as meaning that unions would be denying membership
if they refused to admit employees who "were willing only to pay dues and
fees for the right to work. •.•"8 They said: 'We £nd no evidence of an intent
to distort union-shop agreements into mere devices by which unions can
insure that all employees pay for the right to work. Yet that is the clear effect
of the majority decision." 9 Despite the broad language of both the majority
and minority opinions of the NLRB, the arbitrator in the principal case felt
that the Board decision is not inconsistent with his holding.1~ The arbitrator's
reasoning that the union. does not deny membership where it is specifically
rejected by the. employee seems to be somewhat parallel to the Board minority
view that in order for the union to be said to deny membership the employee
must at least seek it.ll Similarly, his conclusion from the legislative history
of section 8(a)(3) of Tide I of the LMRA that Congress intended the
union shop provision to allow compulsory ·union membership, and not just
compulsory dues paying, agrees with the Board minority view against that of
the majority. Both the House and Senate committee reports would seem to
favor the arbitrator's position.12 The Senate Minority Report also does not
suggest that only a "dues shop" is required. The House Minority Report,
however, does contain a statement that might be susceptible of such an interpretation.13 The debates on the floors of both houses are enlightening in this
connection. Senator Taft, in explaining the bill to his colleagues during debate
and opposing the Ball amendment to ban union shops, described the bill's
union shop provision in terms of compulsory unionization.14 It was during
O

case at 315.
Note 4 supra, at 781.
7Jd. at 785.
8Jd. at 792.
9Jd. at 794.
lOPrlncipal case at 317.
11 Union Starch and Refining Co., note 4 supra, at 792.
12 ". • • 1:equiring employees to become and 1:emain members of the union. • • ."
"Employees have 30 days to decide whether or not to join tb,e union." H. Rep. No. 245
on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 9 (1947). "[The bill] permits ••• such forms of
compulsory unionism ••••" Id. at 34. " ••• permits voluntary agreements for 1:equiring
such forms of compulsory membership••••" S. Rep. No. 105 on S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st
sess., p. 3 (1947).
l? H. Min. Rep. No. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 80 (1947).
14 " ••• if a union shop agreement ••• provided that every man must be a member •••
then the union ••• must accept ••• all who apply for membership." 93 CoNG. REc. 4193
(1947). Also see 93 CoNG. REc. 3837 (1947). "If he [an employee] were willing to enter
the union and pay the same dues as other members ••• he could not be fired ••• because
the union 1:efused to take him." 93 CoNG. REc. 4272 (1947). Senator Ball stated:
Ii Principal
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the Ball amendment debate, after a series of exchanges with Senator Donnell,
who was opposed to any form of compulsoxy union membership,15 that Senator
Taft made the statements relied upon by the Board in deciding that only a
"dues shop" was intended.16 However, even after Senator Taft's explanation,
Senator Donnell apparently still felt that the bill provided for compulsoxy
unionization.17 Only one congressman during the debates seems to have
viewed this provision as requiring merely a dues shop,18 although another used
language that could be so interpreted.19 The debates on the 1951 amendment
to the RLA point toward a requirement of compulsory membership, and indicate an understanding on the part of the congressmen that the Taft-Hartley
Act also requires it.20 Thus the weight of the evidence of legislative intent

" ••• if there happens to be a union shop contract; the individual must, regardless of his own
convictions, join the union mu! pay dues to it." Senator Taft said in answer: " ••• But the
bill permits the union shop, which is the customary form of employment in the United
States.••• In the bill we say that the employee must join the union within 30 days after
he is employed." 93 CoNG. REc. 4885, 4886 (1947). Emphasis added.
15 "I do not regard the payment of dues as the important point; at all ••• the important
point is ••• under the bill as it now stands, a man will not be able to hold a job ••• unless
within 30 days after he takes the job he joins a union, although he may not wish to join
it at all." 93 CoNG, REc. 4886 (1947).
16 "Mr. President, while I think of it, I should like to say that the rule adopted by the
committee is substantially the rule now in effect in Canada. Apparently by a decision of the
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada in an arbitration case, the present rule in Canada
is that there can be a closed shop or a union shop, and the union does not have to admit an
employee who applies for union membership, but the employee must, nevertheless, pay dues,
even though he does not join the union,
"I£ he pays the dues without joining the union, he has the right to be employed. That;
in effect, is a kind of a tax, if you please, for union support, if the union is the recognized
bargaining agent for all the men, but there is no constitutional way by which we can do
that in the United States." 93 CoNG. REc. 4887 (1947). See Union Starch Refining Co.,
note 4 supra, at 785-786. The arbitration case referred to by Senator Taft is Ford Motor
Co. of Canada, I Lab. Arb. Rep. 439 (1946), in which the arbitrator refused to grant a
union shop but awarded a compulsory check-off of dues for all employees to help pay for the
union benefits and as an inducement to join the union.
17 93 CoNG, REc. 4887 (1947).
18 Representative Klein of New York: "This bill pretends to allow a requirement of
membership but really allows only a requirement that dues be paid. Why do not they say
what they mean'?" 93 CoNG. REc. 3447 (1947).
19 Senator Murray: ". • • [an employer] may not discharge an employee for nonmembership in a union unless such nonmembership arises from a failure to pay dues.'' 93
CoNG, REc. 6496 (1947) •
.2o Senator Hill, who reported the amendment out for a unanimous committee was
questioned as follows by Senator Wherry:
''Wherry: That is similar to a provision of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Hill: Yes.•••
Wherry: ••• but I wish to find out what is mandatory about the bill. The railroad
workers who come under this provision of the bill will have to belong to a union. • • • Is
that correct'?
Hill: That is correct. •••" 96 CoNG. REc. 16269 (1950).
Senator Holland in speaking of the amendment said: ". • • [would employees] be
required to join the union-the answer to that question is 'yes'; they would be so required.
• • • There would be no exception to that other than the refusal of the union to admit
them•••• Every man not now a member of the union would be forced to apply for mem-
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appears to support the arbitrator's position that Congress did not intend that
employees could protect themselves from discharge under a union shop contract
merely by paying dues and the initiation fee, but that the employees must be
willing actually to join the union.
Sherman A. Itlaner, S.Ed.

bership••••" .ADd later: " ••• as to whether or not a nonmember of a union now working
in an operating classification would be required at least to apply for membership must be
answered 'Yes'." 96 CoNG. REc. 16331 (1950).

